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Cuban Exceptionalism Revisited 
 
Abstract 
The end of Cuban exceptionalism has been much announced since 1989, but a decade and 
a half later state socialism on the island is still enduring. Transition studies have been criti-
cized for focusing on success stories. Exploring the deviant case of Cuba’s “non-transition” 
from a comparative social science perspective can shed light on the peculiarities of this 
case and, more importantly, test the general assumptions underlying post-1989 expecta-
tions of regime change in Cuba. Theories of path dependence and cumulative causation 
are particularly helpful when attempting to link Cuban current political exceptionalism 
with a more long-term historic perspective. Moreover, they suggest that interpretations of 
Cuba as simply a “belated” case of “third wave” democratization may prove erroneous, 
even when the health of Fidel Castro finally falters. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Der Sonderfall Kuba in vergleichender Perspektive 
Nach 1989 ist das Ende des kubanischen „Sonderfalls“ oft beschworen worden. Doch 
mehr als anderthalb Jahrzehnte nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges behauptet sich der ku-
banische Staatssozialismus noch immer. Wo die Transitionsforschung für ihre Konzentra-
tion auf Erfolgsfälle kritisiert worden ist, kann aus komparativer Perspektive die Analyse 
der kubanischen „Nicht-Transition“ nicht nur den Fall selbst erhellen, sondern – und 
wichtiger noch – jene Annahmen untersuchen, die den Erwartungen eines Systemwech-
sels in Kuba nach 1989 zu Grunde lagen. Theorieansätze zu Pfadabhängigkeit und sich 
selbst verstärkender Ursachenketten („cumulative causation“) können Kubas gegenwärti-
gen politischen Exzeptionalismus im Rahmen einer längerfristigen historischen Perspekti-
ve analysieren. Zudem legen sie nahe, dass auch im Falle des Todes von Fidel Castro 
Sichtweisen wenig adäquat sein werden, die Kuba lediglich als „Nachzügler“ der „dritten 
Demokratisierungswelle“ verstehen interpretieren.  
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1. Introduction 
What are the social laws or “rules” to which twentieth century Cuba appears such a flagrant 
exception? Those who believed that the fall of the Berlin Wall had inaugurated “the end of 
history” will need to concede that at least in this corner of the Caribbean history seems to be 
taking another generation to extinguish itself. It is still just about possible to counter that 
triumphalist claim with Castro’s equally resonant slogan “history will absolve me.” Those 
who believe that state intervention to control the entire economy and marginalize the price 
system had been proven unviable and doomed to collapse will have to cope with the evi-
dence that, compared to other post-Soviet economies, after the initial slump between 1989 
and 1993 Cuba’s economic performance has been at least average, or perhaps even slightly 
better than most. Those who have argued that there is not only one hegemonic “super-
power”, and that U.S. military, economic, political, and cultural supremacy is now such that 
outright resistance to it had become futile, must face the fact that the Castro regime, as tiny 
as the Cuban economy may be in a global perspective, still continues to flaunt its resistance, 
and even to attract occasional new allies to its cause. Those who would argue that no single 
autocrat can remain sane and politically effective after exercising virtually unlimited power 
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over his home territory for up to half a century, have still not come to terms with the secrets 
of Fidel Castro’s psychology and his personal authority. Those who believe that the unques-
tionable yearnings of ordinary Cuban citizens for personal freedom, economic opportunity, 
the right to travel and access information, must be sufficient to overwhelm all the artificial 
props used to sustain a “closed” system of communist party control, have not yet grasped 
either the offsetting power of the regime’s “David v. Goliath” imagery, or the density of its 
formal and informal social controls beyond the security apparatus. In all these, as in other 
related respects, contemporary Cuba is an outlier, a challenge to conventional assumptions, 
a demonstration that there are “more things in heaven and earth” than are dreamt of in 
what passes for philosophy inside the Washington beltway.1  
Many announced the end of Cuban exceptionalism after 19892. Cuban state socialism was 
seen as an offshoot of the bipolar Cold War era, bound to disappear with the dissolution of 
its potent overseas allies. According to widespread expectations, the Caribbean “domino” 
had to fall sooner rather than later. The forces of globalization would not allow an island just 
90 miles off the U.S. coastline to maintain a state-socialist economic order and one-party-
rule, and defy its powerful Northern neighbor. Cuba would become part of the “third wave” 
of democratization that swept away socialist regimes from Berlin to Vladivostok. Whatever 
the scenario and outcome of a Cuban transition, in the 1990s many saw it as only a matter of 
time before Cuban exceptionalism gave way, and the island joined the ranks of other “really 
existing democracies” in Latin America. But what has happened instead is that Cuban state 
socialism not only survived the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, but 
has actually managed to consolidate its position in new and unexpected ways.  
Exploring the persistence of Cuban exceptionalism tells us about the particularities of the 
Cuban case and, what is more important, about the general assumptions underlying post-
1989 expectations of regime change in Cuba. Transition studies have been criticized for fo-
cusing on success stories. By studying Cuba this balance can be partially redressed, and light 
can be shed on the conditions for “non-transition.”  
 
 
2. Cuban Exceptionalism 
Cuban exceptionalism does not preclude the considerations of comparative analyses rele-
vant to the Cuban case. Exercises in comparison are as much about specifying and explain-
ing contrasts as identifying similarities. From a comparative social scientific perspective, it is 
                                                     
1  Hamlet: “There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philoso-
phy” (Hamlet, Act I, Scene V). 
2  The most recent example is: Centeno (2004). 
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necessary to pay attention to “exceptions” and “deviant cases” as well as to average and 
exemplary examples. Such non-standard or deviant experiences help us to specify the scope 
and limits of the normal outcomes that can be explained by a generally applicable theory. 
Thus, for example, studying Cuba as (so far) a case of “non-transition” can sharpen up our 
theories of democratic transition, and counter the bias towards “successful outcomes” that 
can easily distort our retrospective theory building.  
But it is not just with regard to theories of democratic transition that the Cuban case has 
proved so challenging and intractable. Twentieth century Cuba has appeared thus far to fal-
sify the predictions of a long list of cherished social science theories. According to “moderniza-
tion” theory the Cuba of the 1950s was the most unlikely setting for a socialist revolution. Its 
high levels of urbanization, literacy, income per capita, and exposure to the U.S. market and 
culture should have favored irreversible democratization, not the installation of a highly per-
sonalist one party regime. Traditional Marxism was equally confounded. The “stage theory” 
embraced by (among others) the pre-Castro Cuba Communist Party (then called the PSP) was 
that further development of capitalism was necessary before socialism could become a reality. 
But the Cuban Revolution both defied modernization theory and skipped stages. Similarly, 
the realist school of thought in international relations would have predicted that of all the 
subordinate allies of the U.S., Cuba was virtually the one that was most securely “locked into” 
the so-called Free World. But the Cuban Revolution achieved the unthinkable: it defied Wash-
ington, survived, and successfully reversed alliances. Once that shocking result had been ab-
sorbed, standard realism would then predict that an isolated and vulnerable Castro regime, 
only able to survive thanks to Soviet support, would become a pliable “proxy” for Moscow 
foreign policy objectives. Instead, Havana provided the “small motor” that drove the Soviet 
bloc as a whole to adopt policies (especially in Africa) that were much more active and radical 
than those envisaged by the sclerotic bureaucrats in the Kremlin. So realism has been twice 
falsified. Cuba has also defied Fukuyama’s “End of History” thesis, an overarching frame of 
interpretation it seemed to work for the rest of Latin America – and indeed much of the world 
– at least in the 1990s. Again, Cuba proved to be the exception throughout that decade, and the 
Castro regime has now lasted long enough to witness a “return of history” both globally and 
in its own region. This list of standard theories that have all spectacularly failed to work in the 
Cuban context is illustrative rather than exhaustive. But it is long enough to raise a fundamen-
tal question of method. What more would have to happen in Cuba that falsifies macro-
historical social science predictions, before the island’s historical trajectory can be acknowl-
edged as distinctively “exceptional”? Or is “exceptionalism” a taboo category, which should 
never be used whatever the evidence, for fear of subverting the commitment of modern social 
science to universalism? 
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A focus on the Cuban case also draws attention to the multi-dimensionality of key concepts 
in the theoretical literature. Thus, for example, if democracy is understood to refer to the 
ideal of popular sovereignty, this has, at least, two components – self-determination, and 
rule by the people. Facing massive and sustained external pressure the Cuban revolutionary 
regime has made resistance to foreign domination its central claim to democratic legitimacy. 
But the internal dimension (the sovereign struggle of the citizenry to choose and control its 
government) is an equally indispensable component of popular sovereignty that has been 
severely relegated in revolutionary Cuba.  
Contemporary Cuban exceptionalism is both political and economic. Not only did Cuba not 
undergo the standard post-Soviet transition to a market economy via collapse and privatiza-
tion, but it also resisted the more gradualist – or a “social democratic” – variant of a man-
aged transition as envisaged by many European advisors. Indeed, despite the continuing 
and even tightened U.S. embargo and in spite of the failure of acercamientos with Canada, 
Mexico, and the EU, the Cuban economy, although weak and distorted, is displaying unex-
pected signs of resilience and even of partial recovery. In addition in its management of the 
economic crisis the government has shown an uncanny ability to blend politics and econom-
ics in such a way as to ensure economic survival and purchase a new generation of political 
loyalties.  
It is said that Castro is better at politics than at economics. The statement is hard to refute 
when one considers the fact that he has remained in power for more than 47 years, and 
when one notes the material shortcomings suffered by his subject population over this 
nearly half century. But this statement overlooks something that is a key to understanding 
the survival of the Cuban regime: that the political trumps the economic logic in Cuba, or in 
official parlance: “Our political system, which enshrines the people’s power, is the foremost 
accomplishment that we must safeguard, because all others depend on it” (Partido Comuni-
sta de Cuba 1997). If potential economic benefits mean compromising on political essentials, 
Fidel Castro will renounce those benefits, even when this entails such extraordinarily high 
economic costs that it leaves foreign observers baffled. This is what European leaders had to 
deal with in 2003 when Castro fell out with the European Union, shunning development 
cooperation and disrupting commercial relations over the European attempt to impose “po-
litical conditionality.” This is even clearer in the case of U.S. Cuba policy: all sanctions and 
embargo measures imposed by Washington since 1959 have manifestly failed to elicit politi-
cal compliance. This is so not only because the Cuban leadership found an ally in Moscow, 
but also – as the post 1989 years show – because Havana was willing to absorb enormously 
high costs and adopt “virtually a war economy” (Castro 1991: 57) to cope with the quasi-
collapse of the island’s trade, production, and monetary systems.  
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However, this is only one part of the story. There has not only been austerity but also more 
liberalization than either Cuban policy-makers or their detractors like to admit. The survival 
of a socialist state at the heart of the Americas rests as much on the Cuban propensity to re-
spond to change as on its insistence on pursuing a separate path. Recent changes in eco-
nomic management, such as the replacement of U.S. dollar circulation by a “convertible 
peso,” have been widely interpreted as a reversal of prior reforms and as likely to com-
pound existing difficulties. Increases in salaries, consumer spending and public investment 
have been made possible by changing external conditions. The always politicized external 
economic relations of the Cuban Revolution have been profoundly altered again by the arri-
val of two new saviors: a political partner and economic benefactor in the form of Vene-
zuela’s Hugo Chávez; and Communist China, a new source of commercial credit given that 
country’s increased outreach activities in Latin America in general and in Cuba in particular. 
Both changes appear to be reinforcing a statist, centrally directed model of economic man-
agement. And yet, as with earlier reforms, appearances can be deceptive: above all, the Cu-
ban model of “defiance” is one of creative adaptation to circumstances. There is no reason to 
expect this to change.  
In the 1990s the impact of the economic crisis led to the erosion of the state’s economic ca-
pacity and to the emergence of new inequalities which Centeno has taken as an indication of 
Cuba’s “return to Latin America:” “The great Cuban exceptionalism in health and education 
may be wearing thin” (Centeno 2004: 404). While the quality of health and educational ser-
vices on the island have suffered severely compared to the 1980s, the universality and gratu-
ity of these services has remained untouched. Illustrating the argument of cumulative causa-
tion, what started out as exceptional social coverage for the domestic population has now 
translated into an at least as exceptional transformation of such “revolutionary accomplish-
ments” into non-traditional exports that generate hard currency income as well as important 
political benefits as key elements of Cuba’s current foreign policy. Similarly, the inequalities 
that emerged in the 1990s have not led to ever-growing social polarization but, quite to the 
contrary, have come under attack from the state’s drive to re-centralize and re-ideologize the 
economy, which has been striking out emphatically against the “nouveaux riches” and (legal 
or illegal) market actors. Informality, although always present in socialist Cuba (as in other 
socialist states), peaked in the mid-1990s but has since experienced a gradual decline. And 
while the “Chávez bonanza” may arguably be based on shaky economic grounds, it is diffi-
cult to see the island as being currently “just as much involved in the infamous ‘race to the 
bottom’ as its neighbors”(Centeno 2004: 408).  
If Cuba’s economic policy can be subordinated to the logic of survival of the political sys-
tem, a reverse feedback is equally possible: an economic policy like Cuba’s is viable only in a 
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vertical political system that is able to administer a dramatic decline in living standards 
without being “disturbed” by public protest or subjected to the negotiating capacity of in-
dependent social actors. If theories of path dependence have any merit then Cuba’s current 
political exceptionalism can be linked to its historic origins, to the special role that the coun-
try played in the Spanish Empire, to its belated independence and to its subordinate position 
to the U.S. during the first half of the twentieth century. This historical perspective contrasts 
with the understanding of Cuban exceptionalism as being limited to the “revolutionary ep-
och” after 1959. This is Centeno’s perspective, for instance,3 and leads him to argue that the 
current “return to Latin America” he diagnoses translates into the “end of Cuban exception-
alism.” Such a long-term perspective highlights the role of geo-politics, and the discursive 
power of revolutionary nationalism, and suggests that theories of cumulative causation can 
explain much of the political course taken since 1959. This is a product both of structure and 
of choice. At the structural level, the concentration of economic and political power at the 
apex of the revolutionary system made possible the authoritarian implantation of a project 
of social transformation, which has now lasted for almost half a century, and has systemati-
cally deepened the gulf separating the Cuban people from most of the major tendencies at 
work in the rest of the western hemisphere. This objective parting the ways has also created 
a subjective and discursive divide, which makes continuing “exceptionalist” choices not 
only possible, but probable. Strategic options that would be almost unthinkable in most 
Latin American countries become logical first preferences in Cuban conditions. 
“History will absolve me,” reads the title of Fidel Castro’s famous defense in the trials after 
the attack on the Moncada barracks in 1953. When state socialism in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe collapsed after 1989, history seemed to have turned against the Cuban 
leader who had tied Cuba’s political and economic destiny closely to those powerful over-
seas allies. In the official rhetoric of the early 1990s history no longer signaled a bright future 
on the horizon but became the legitimizing framework for a stubborn defense of the duty to 
resistir!, in the name of the century-old struggles for Cuban independence, first against 
Spanish colonial rule and then U.S. neo-colonial tutelage. This has changed. Cuban state 
socialism managed to survive the painful decade of the 1990s and in the first decade of the 
new millennium Cuba’s leadership no longer sees itself as the last bulwark of the just cause 
holding out against all odds but, once again, as the vanguard of the epic struggles of the 
Latin American continent.  
In the second half of the 1990s, a gradual economic recovery began, led by tourism earnings 
and the high level of remittances from Cuban emigrants. Living conditions still are precari-
                                                     
3  “Prior to 1959, Cuba exemplified many of these issues, but for the past four decades, it has repre-
sented the great exception to the Latin American trend” (Centeno 2004: 404). 
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ous in many ways but they are a far cry from the “this-ship-is-sinking” atmosphere of 1993-
1994 when the crisis hit bottom. While the world of the regular Cuban peso certainly illus-
trates all too well what Kornai (1980) had called “the economics of shortage,” it is routine, 
not despair that marks daily life in Cuba today.  
In terms of political economy, this recovery has led to a virtual halt of reform measures. In-
troduced under the pressure of crisis, such reforms are increasingly seen as concessions or as 
erroneous, and as no longer necessary, and so ought to be corrected. While in the mid-1990s 
foreign observers discussed the “when” and “how,” rather than the “if” of Cuban reform 
towards more market driven mechanisms, a full-scale roll-back in the form of a perfec-
cionamiento del socialismo (the perfecting of socialism) is now under way. If the legalization of 
the U.S. dollar in 1993 was a highly symbolic step, so is the ban of U.S. dollar circulation and 
its substitution with the Convertible Cuban Peso in 2004. In fact, the government has de-
clared the end of the período especial (special period), understood as the phase when Cuban 
socialism was forced to resort to what Fidel Castro referred to as “measures we do not like” 
in his 1993 speech legalizing the U.S. currency (Castro 1993). In May 2005 Fidel Castro an-
nounced an overnight hike of minimum wages by 225 percent and a 300 percent rise in 
minimum pensions. As the government was quick to point out, this spectacular increase 
involves dedicating an additional 2.25 billion Cuban pesos to the annual budget – roughly 
US$ 100 million at the rate of the official Cuban exchange houses. With this act of largesse, 
that to many observers is reminiscent of the voluntarism of the early years of the Revolution, 
Havana signals what it claims to be the light at the end of the tunnel of daily hardship.  
The measure has led some economists to warn against the potentially negative inflationary 
consequences and, indeed, the material base for such a spending increase cannot possibly be 
found in Cuban domestic production. In the very short run the ban of the U.S. dollar has 
filled the state coffers with a considerable amount of cash as Cubans rushed to exchange 
their greenbacks for convertible pesos before the announced 10 percent surcharge came into 
force. But the new economic confidence displayed by the Cuban authorities is based on a 
more long term reason: the ever closer alliance with the Venezuelan government and the 
apparent consolidation and radicalization of Chávez’ “Bolivarian Revolution.” This is just 
the most recent in the long line of external patrons or sponsors that has characterized Cuban 
politics since the nineteenth century. And it signals that Cuba is not only “returning to Latin 
America” as argued by Centeno, but also that important emerging actors in Latin America 
are “returning to Cuba” with rather unexpected enthusiasm, with Chávez and Bolivia’s Evo 
Morales being the most prominent cases. 
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3. A New International Patron 
At the rhetorical level Hugo Chávez emphatically embraces the revolutionary legacy of 
Fidel Castro, and has willingly played on the father-son imagery, presenting himself as the 
only successor that is ready to carry the historic relay baton of the continent’s epic anti-
imperialist struggle. Although the “Bolivarian Revolution” has shied away from clear ideo-
logical definition, Chávez now seems to have embraced the rhetoric of “Socialism of the 
twenty-first century” (this could still mean many disparate things, but it does have the vir-
tue, from a Cuban point of view, of opting for the term “socialist” and of clearly rhyming 
with Cuba Socialista). This political affinity is accompanied by no less important economic 
support. In the streets in Havana the news that the country has nuevos rusos is already mak-
ing the rounds. This is obviously an exaggeration, but Venezuelan oil revenues mean that 
this is an ally with great economic potential, all the more so at current world market oil 
prices. In 2004, the Venezuelan state-owned oil company PdVSA officially handed over a 
record US$ 11.9 billion to the Caracas government, 60 percent more than the government 
had budgeted; and the oil bonanza continues unabated in 2006. While most of this is ab-
sorbed by domestic priorities, Caracas has diverted major sums to further its international 
priorities. 
Cuba has been tapping these resources successfully through a series of cooperation agree-
ments, the most prominent of which is a barter arrangement allowing Cuba to pay for Vene-
zuelan oil shipments by sending thousands of medical doctors and sports trainers to work in 
Chávez’ social programs. The precise terms of the agreements and the dimension of de facto 
Venezuelan subsidies to Cuba are open to speculation, and one can only guess what credit 
lines Venezuela is or will be willing to grant Cuba. So while current oil prices allow for 
much generosity, the question remains how sustainable this lifeline will be. Oil prices and 
political conditions in Venezuela may change, and Venezuelan support for Cuba may not 
prove to be such a blank cheque as some currently assume. For the time being, however, 
relations between both countries are more intense than ever. In October 2005, Cuban polit-
buro member Carlos Lage declared in Caracas that the destinies of both countries are now so 
closely bound that “Cuba now has two presidents, Fidel and Chávez” (cited by AFP, Octo-
ber 7, 2005). Since then, the launch of the ALBA integration scheme, however unclear its 
substance, the use of health and educational service exports as foreign policy vehicles, and 
the prominently displayed new bonds of friendship with the government of Evo Morales in 
Bolivia have underscored Havana’s renewed internationalist appeal and ambitions.  
Thus, if in the mid-1990s the achievement of the Cuban leadership was to steer a process of 
limited economic opening while maintaining its political control – well described as the 
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“gatekeeper state” by Javier Corrales (2004) – what we have witnessed since about 2000, is 
not just the persistence of a centrally planned economy long abandoned elsewhere, but even 
the re-imposition of a degree of state direction and management that faltered during the 
most acute phase of the crisis. This has been possible not just because of tourism and remit-
tances, important though they have been in cushioning the dollar shortage, but also because 
of the continued ability of the Cuban regime to engage with external benefactors seeking a 
counterweight to U.S. hegemony. This recurring logic is now being played out with 
Chavez's Venezuela and China, a new source of commercial credit. For Chávez, the main 
incentive to subsidize Cuba is the symbolic importance of Fidel Castro and of Cuban social-
ism as a bulwark against the dominance of the U.S. and neo-liberal economics; and for 
China there is some geopolitical advantage in moderately supporting a regime so strategi-
cally located at the centre of the Caribbean and so persistently in confrontation with the U.S. 
And so once again, as argued by the thesis of cumulative causation, it is the survival of ex-
ceptionalism in itself that creates the conditions allowing for the perpetuation of that excep-
tionalism.  
The recent announcements that “good times are coming” may also reflect a serious concern of 
the Cuban leadership: that the patience of its people is not an infinite resource. The relative 
economic stabilization the regime has achieved does not automatically translate into a parallel 
recovery of political prestige. The government has launched a massive “ideological offensive,” 
kicked off by the infamous 1996 “Report of the Politburo” that frontally attacked the intellec-
tual reform debate then underway. This campaign reached a first climax with the mass mobi-
lizations over the Elián case in 2000 and is by now firmly entrenched in the emphatic rhetoric 
of the “battle of ideas.” But the mesas redondas and tribunas abiertas that flood the official media 
play to a largely passive audience. The calls for heroic causes and self-disinterested commit-
ment contrast sharply with the realities of everyday life, deeply marked by what the Cubans 
call the need to resolver their daily needs by resorting to a wide array of formal and informal 
means, from networks of relatives or friends, to black or grey market activities, to contacts 
with foreigners or with socios (buddies) somewhere in the bureaucratic structure. The ritual-
ized mass mobilizations of today are a far cry from the enthusiasm of the early 1960s which 
they pretend to emulate. The younger generation that has known nothing but the hardships 
and retreats of the special period is particularly alienated. 
The gap between private and public attitudes has become so wide that it hardly seems sus-
tainable over time. While open political defiance remains limited to a small minority of the 
population, there is a very blurred line between what some call “passive consensus”, and 
resigned acceptance or quiet obedience. There are no reliable ways to measure just how se-
vere this popular dissatisfaction has become. Nevertheless, the income and pensions hike 
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and similar measures can be read as a signal that the Cuban leadership is well aware of the 
need to regain some of its eroding social base, that heroic rhetoric alone will not do, and that 
quite ordinary material underpinnings are necessary. At the same time, however, the path of 
“perfecting socialism” does not necessarily mean a full return to the orthodox economic 
model of the defunct bureaucratic socialism with central planning and Moscow-style five-
year plans. The “gatekeeper state” – which incorporates quasi-capitalist structures under 
state control – seems to be here to stay. When Fidel Castro personally goes on television to 
explain the benefits of a new Chinese rice cooker that is to be massively distributed to the 
population, these kinds of distributive measures may have less to do with orthodox social-
ism than with older populist traditions that are so resilient in much of Latin America. 
There is a similar process at work at the political level. Hidden beneath the overwhelming 
continuity of the political system as embodied by the sustained leadership of Fidel Castro, 
are the significant changes undergone by the regime. Perhaps the most stunning of these is 
the ongoing process of de-institutionalization. Although the official structures of Party and 
State apparatus have remained very much untouched, it is notable that the next Party Con-
gress is long overdue (it is ostensibly held every five years and is formally the highest body 
of authority of what is the back-bone institution of classic Communist rule). And nobody is 
bothering (or daring) to ask when it may take place. The office of the “battle of ideas” has 
evolved into a parallel super-ministry with a wide array of programs covering the most di-
verse fields, and has effectively sidelined the competencies of the respective ministries or 
other established government authorities. And, while the country’s leader is visibly ageing, 
the personalist nature of the regime has been accentuated in multiple domains, from the 
recruitment of cadres for top positions to the ideological discourse of the “battle of ideas.” 
 
 
4. The Exceptionalism of Cuban Regime Change 
Various arguments and theories have been developed in the study of democratization proc-
esses that, when applied to Cuba, seem to lose their explanatory power, or at least to become 
sufficiently subverted that they end up re-emphasizing the thesis of Cuban exceptionalism. 
Let us now look at some of the challenges that the Cuban case presents to the comparative 
study of transition or democratization. 
A first example of how Cuba subverts expectations that seem reasonable elsewhere is ap-
parent when looking at the role of the Internet in political change (Hoffmann 2004). A key 
argument in the thesis of globalization as a force of democratization is that new digital 
communication technologies, particularly the Internet, cannot be controlled by states be-
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cause of their intrinsic border-crossing and decentralized nature and that free access to in-
formation will eventually make it very difficult if not impossible to contain freedom. In the 
words of former U.S. President Bill Clinton (2000), “in the new century liberty will spread by 
cell phones and cable modem!” 
The Cuban government was initially highly cautious. The so-called Torricelli law enacted 
by the U.S. Congress in 1992 promoted intensified communication with Cuba as a strategy 
to undermine the political system. Cuba only decided to establish an IP connection to the 
Internet in 1996 – the last country in the hemisphere to do so – when it felt sufficiently as-
sured that political risks could be minimized. It did so after the “Report of the Politburo,” 
which attacked the reform debate in the harshest terms, decried the concept of civil society 
(used by Cuban scholars as means to introduce a more pluralist approach within the so-
cialist framework) as a “Trojan Horse of Imperialism”, in the words of Raúl Castro (1996). 
It also did so only after keenly observing how the Peking government made Internet use 
compatible with one-party rule. Cuba not only imports most of the technological hardware 
of its networks but also know-how in security and administration matters from China. So 
although Cuba is now online, the government keeps close watch on access to international 
networks by ensuring that computer and network density remains low, and that most con-
nected computers only have access to closed domestic networks (what the government 
calls “Cubanet”) rather than the World Wide Web. Access to computers that are connected 
to the latter is generally only possible from within institutions or in public spaces (both 
subject to social control mechanisms that are reinforced by the technical controls, which 
the quasi-state monopoly on provider services make possible). Domestic residential access 
is prohibited and in 2002 the government launched an effective campaign against unau-
thorized Internet access, squeezing the limited black market for passwords and Internet 
access even further.  
Thus, articles by dissident journalists, which are transmitted by phone to supporters outside 
the island and put online abroad, or the homepage of the U.S. Department of State, nor in-
deed any other web-based media, reach a broad audience on the island on a regular basis. 
Cuba has not experienced the transnationalization of its domestic public sphere, as propo-
nents of the thesis that the Internet is a force for democratization have argued. The backdrop 
to these restrictions on Internet access is that they not only minimize the political impact of 
the new communication technologies, but that they also severely limit their potential devel-
opmental benefits. So here too, the economic logic remains subordinated to the political 
logic. The government is ready to assume the high economic costs implicit in manifold re-
strictions on Internet access if in this way the Internet will not pose any immediate threat to 
the state monopoly over mass media or to regime stability.  
16 Hoffmann/Whitehead: Cuban Exceptionalism Revisited 
A second example of Cuba’s exceptionalism is related to the expected role of civil society in 
processes of political change. Studies of democratization have often highlighted the key role 
played by civil society in such processes. In Cuba, there has been a revitalization of civic and 
other organizations not dominated by the government in recent years. This has contributed 
to an expanding public sphere through the development of various “mini-spheres” of dis-
course throughout Cuba, contradicting the expectation that the circulation of discourse is 
essentially determined from the commanding heights of the state. The reaction of the Cuban 
political class has been to restrict the debate about civil society and to limit the broadening 
of the public sphere by denouncing “civil society” as “fifth column” operating on behalf of 
U.S. interests. As a consequence, although there is widespread societal discontent and al-
though the everyday experience of state-society and citizen-citizen interactions has been 
reshaped, this has not translated into civil society mobilization. At some local levels and in 
various discrete social domains (as in cinema, music, and some areas of science) there have 
been significant manifestations of pluralism and outreach to the external world but the state 
continues to maintain ideological and political hegemony on the core issues of revolutionary 
continuity and defiance of Washington. There is a notable variety of counter-discourses that 
have no more than a limited social impact, in part because collective action outside the state 
is too costly, but also because dissent from within must always guard against identification 
with subversion from without. 
A third illustration of the difficulties of extrapolation lies in the logic of Latin American 
transition studies. Ever since the onset of crisis in Cuba in the late 1980s observers have been 
keen to identify individual political figures as “hardliners” or “softliners.” But there has 
been a lot more speculation than evidence. People identified by foreign observers as poten-
tial leaders of a “reformist” or “perestroika-minded” wing within the party have been 
ousted at too early a stage for one to know whether such claims were well-founded (this was 
the case with General Arnaldo Ochoa, the highest-ranking military man after Raúl Castro, 
who was executed following a show trial on drug and conspiracy charges in 1989; or of Car-
los Aldana, who at the peak of his career in 1992 was the highest-ranking member of the 
Politburo after the Castro brothers and who was dismissed after being publicly charged 
with corruption, obliged to undertake a “self-criticism” and then stripped of all influence). 
The most sustained “reformer thesis” was based on generational change, and embodied by 
three Politburo members who are a generation younger than Fidel and Raúl Castro: Carlos 
Lage who was born in 1951 and is usually credited as the architect of the economic reforms 
of the mid-1990s, former foreign minister Roberto Robaina, who was born in 1956, and Abel 
Prieto, the long-haired President of the writers’ and artists’ association (UNEAC) born in 
1950. The fate of these “potential reformists” has been more complex and varied. Robaina 
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was dismissed in 1999 under corruption charges much like Aldana, but Prieto remains Min-
ister of Culture and member of the Politburo despite some moments of isolation, and Carlos 
Lage is still Vice-President of the Council of State and a member of the politburo. This may 
look a lot like continuity, but their status and the popular perception of their influence has 
changed. Lage embodied hopes for economic reform but was then a loyal servant when the 
reversal came; Prieto embodied the hope for greater cultural and intellectual heterodoxy and 
autonomy, but he also closed ranks with the party line when the tide turned back to the 
crude ideological campaigns, narrowing the room for intellectual debate. In the process, 
both lost popular credibility as potential exponents of a reform option from above.  
Time has taken its toll on their standing within the party as well. They were once regarded 
as the people who would replace the “old guard,” but the leadership of this generation is 
being eclipsed by that of a younger generation of party cadres who are not identified with 
any reformist attitudes of any kind. First among these is Felipe Pérez Roque, who replaced 
Robaina as foreign minister and who was presented in the National Assembly session of 
December 2005 in a way that fell just short of declaring him as Fidel Castro’s designated 
successor; Otto Rivero, who heads the “office for the battle of ideas”, is another prime ex-
ample.4 Neither the reformers nor the intransigents possess sufficient security of tenure to 
open up a sustained competition over the scope and limits of liberalization. The Castro re-
gime remains so verticalist that only the very highest levels of leadership can exercise that 
degree of strategic choice. The Comandante has observed how democratization emerged in 
other post-revolutionary and post-communist regimes, and he retains the discretion to block 
or manipulate any such developments on his island. 
A fourth – perhaps one of the most familiar – illustration of Cuban exceptionalism is the 
unique role played by its emigrant population since 1959. Certainly, having roughly a tenth of 
one’s population abroad is hardly exceptional for the region, but the characteristics of that 
emigration as its implications for the sending country are indeed exceptional. The economic 
success story of Cuban émigrés, embodied by the transformation of Miami from a secondary 
tourist resort into a dynamic business metropolis, is singular (see Portes/Stepick 1993). No 
other Latin American migrant group in the U.S. has a parallel history or political impact. Pro-
viding almost five decades of staunch political opposition to the Castro regime has been cru-
cial for the social cohesion and identity of a community that ceased to be one of ”exiles” and 
took on the “hyphen identity” of today’s Cuban-Americans. And it was precisely the blocked 
                                                     
4  In May 2005 Wilfredo López Rodríguez who had been head of the Grupo de Apoyo y Coordinación 
del Comandante en Jefe since 1995, was dismissed and as far as we can tell has not yet been replaced. 
His ouster was not reported publicly until August 2005, and so gave rise to much speculation. 
18 Hoffmann/Whitehead: Cuban Exceptionalism Revisited 
option of return to the island that led exiled Cubans to acquire U.S. citizenship, and this in 
turn laid the foundation for their extraordinarily successful involvement in U.S. politics.  
The attitude of the Cuban diaspora to their homeland differs significantly from attitudes of 
other migrant groups. The Chinese diaspora (including conservative businessmen) may be po-
litically opposed to the Peking government, but a resurgent China does appeal to their nation-
alist sentiments and opens up highly attractive business and professional opportunities for the 
community abroad – albeit under the watchful eye of the Communist Party. Mexican-
Americans, Irish-Americans and Jewish-Americans all wish to see their home countries doing 
better, if only to enhance their prestige and influence within the U.S. By contrast, the social, 
political and economic success of the Cuban-American community in the U.S. has been closely 
linked to its ability to capitalize by opposition on the “symbolic capital” of the Cuban Revolu-
tion embodied by Fidel Castro. This particular cold war has outlived the Cold War even a 
decade and a half after the demise of the Soviet Union and with it the oversized symbolic im-
portance of Fidel Castro that is so essential a facet of the high-profile political standing of the 
exile in the U.S. Cuban community. This is bound to change in any pos-Castro transition sce-
nario. Cuban-American identity and the Cuban-American insertion in U.S. politics will face a 
serious challenge if Cuba is “re-sized” to its “true” dimensions (a rather small and poor Carib-
bean island again dependent on the goodwill of the U.S.). 
The specificities of Cuban emigration have contributed to the longevity of the Castro regime. 
Unlike the Eastern Europe state-socialist regimes, Cuba’s tended to keep the emigration door 
open. This served an important safety-valve function along the lines described by Hirschman 
(1970) in his “exit and voice” scheme, but has also helped stabilize the regime in other ways. 
The explicit political alliance between the dominant exile groups and Washington’s foreign 
policy-making elite has always nourished a key element of regime survival: the melding of the 
Cuban “political question” and its “national question.” And emigration is far from being such 
a dichotomous “exit” category as per the Hirschman model. Despite sharp political polariza-
tion, Cuban emigrants have maintained strong transnational ties with those living on the is-
land. These surfaced in a particularly spectacular form during the crisis years of the 1990s, 
when the massive inflow of U.S. dollar remittances not only helped many Cuban families to 
make ends meet. Again, the increasing importance of family remittances from emigrants is a 
feature of many Latin American countries and hardly exceptional; however, it is certainly ex-
ceptional that those who emigrate provide a crucial financial lifeline for the regime even 
though the majority define themselves explicitly in opposition to the government in their 
home country. So the exceptional story of Cuban emigration and the ambiguities of Cuba’s 
“exiles” are part and parcel of explaining the country’s political exceptionalism.  
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A final and perhaps the most striking feature of most contemporary analysis of Cuban poli-
tics is the way it so closely identifies any political change with the death of Fidel Castro. Of 
course there can be no doubt that the “Castro regime” will enter into a profound period of 
change when that inevitable biological event finally occurs. But we may need to differentiate 
between the physical death of the Comandante and the “demise of authoritarian rule” to use 
the catchphrase of the transitology literature. The Yugoslav regime survived for a consider-
able period after the death of Tito, as did Salazarism after the death of Salazar. Spain, where 
the death of Franco cleared the path to a rapid democratic transition, represents an extreme 
rather than a dominant pattern. Arguably conditions in Spain were “over-ripe” and it was 
only the survival of the dictator that disguised underlying changes. This was not the case in 
Vietnam after Ho Chi Minh or in China after Mao either. The aim here is not to engage in 
futurology but to explore the impact of future expectations on the present. The excessive fo-
cus on the mortality of Fidel Castro distorts current analysis and Cuban politics dynamics. 
The oft-heard phrase “once Castro dies...” may often be intended to raise expectations, but 
what it also does is imply that as long he remains alive nothing of interest will or can change 
in Havana.  
It is misguided to imagine that ruling groups in Havana are simply waiting passively for an 
endgame that they can neither foretell nor control. On the contrary, rival factions (and dif-
ferent generational cohorts) compete with one another for control of strategic positions that 
are likely to prove decisive in the struggle for power that they foresee arising when the uni-
fying leader is gone. And that old ruler himself is equally active in promoting and demoting 
these succession competitors so as to prolong his ascendancy as long as possible and also as 
a way to steer the course of his regime in the direction he judges most conducive to its long-
term survival. A generation of young “reformists” came to the fore in the 1990s, who be-
lieved they would be in the pole position to capitalize on any “normalization” of relations 
with the rest of the world. But now there is an even younger generation of hard-line mili-
tants being promoted, who are persuaded by the idea that it will be the pure et dure who may 
prove to be the true heirs of Castroism. It is unclear whether either of these two groups will 
be the final beneficiaries of Fidel’s patronage when the balance of his rule is eventually 
made. Indeed, the personal power of Fidel is served at home and abroad by analyses that 
focus on a death that still take some time to come.  
Broader questions about the real inheritance of the regime and the best options for preserv-
ing its achievements and correcting its deficiencies should be debated in the interim. During 
the 1990s the prevailing conventional wisdom about Cuba among Western social scientists 
was broadly a liberal internationalist one. The assumption has been that democratization 
and convergence on a standard template of liberal politics and open market economies was 
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inevitable and that the only question was how quickly and painlessly individual nations 
undertook these linked transitions. According to this “end of history” and “third wave” 
framework of analysis the future of post-Castro Cuba was predetermined, leaving room 
only for debate about whether the “ever faithful isle” would take that step very much later 
than the rest of the western hemisphere, or how much international pressure and guidance 
might be required, or how far behind Cuban economy and society would have to fall before 
it could be turned around. Since the (questionable) election of George W. Bush to the U.S. 
presidency in 2000 this kind of liberal triumphalism has suffered a series of setbacks, but as 
far as Cuba is concerned the dominant interpretation has remained largely intact. As Fidel 
Castro grows older and visibly frailer and as Havana passes up successive opportunities to 
soften its course, the predetermined denouement is assumed to be drawing ever nearer. It 
was in that spirit that US Secretary of State Rice appointed a “Cuba transition coordinator” 
in July 2005, and that the US National Intelligence Council reportedly added Cuba to its se-
cret watch-list of countries in which instability might require U.S. intervention.5 But the re-
consideration of Cuban exceptionalism casts doubt on the reliability of such an interpreta-
tive framework. So much time has elapsed since the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, and so 
many developments have occurred that make sense of events within an “exceptionalism” 
framework that are anomalous according to the orthodox view, that intellectual honesty 
demands some re-analysis. 
The image of a Cuba that is politically paralyzed and waiting for an act of God is both erro-
neous and politically convenient for those who are not interested in seriously preparing for 
the future. A more positive variant of the exceptionalism thesis would point to a different 
conclusion. To think constructively about the scope for regime change and the dynamics of a 
potential transition requires breaking with the stalemate over Castro’s personalism and fo-
cusing instead on the distinctive collective structures and memories that drive island politics 
(and make them differ from standard templates). If it falls to the Cuban people to decide 
their own future they will have an unusually rich array of precedents to draw upon, and an 
exceptionally large number of foundational issues to resolve. For example, they could in 
principle base an eventual post-Castro political settlement on the 1976 Socialist Constitution 
(with Varela-type modifications). Or they could revert to the 1940 precedent. Indeed, if 
Washington’s will were to prevail, the Helms Burton Law would take them back to the 
semi-sovereign electoral system of 1902-1933. In addition to this unusual variety of constitu-
tional starting points, they would have to define who could be included in a democratic set-
tlement (one in which emigrés could take part) and on what terms (with wholesale property 
restitution, or on the basis of the current socialized distribution of assets?) Deeply entangled 
                                                     
5  As reported by The Financial Times, November 1, 2005. 
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with these basic choices about the “rules of the game” would be the question of how to re-
negotiate their relations with the rest of the world (not only with Washington and Miami) 
but also with Madrid, Caracas, Beijing, and others.  
After all, the U.S. is most unlikely to envisage annexation of the island, so any post-Castro 
settlement will have to be on the basis of an international reaffirmation of its formal sover-
eignty. All this means that Cuba’s exceptional political trajectory leaves their eventual fu-
ture extraordinarily under-determined and potentially open to choice and institutional 
innovation. 
However, to capitalize on this potential the Cuban people would need an extended space for 
collective reflection and deliberation, something that may not be easy to attain in the most 
likely transition scenarios. If they could secure that opportunity for autonomous political 
construction they might freely conclude that the costs of continuing to deviate so far from 
standard models of economic and political liberalization were too high. They might there-
fore choose to terminate their record of exceptionalism. But they could also conclude that 
after all the sacrifices they have made and all the costs they have borne, they were not will-
ing to relinquish all aspects of their past half-century’s political legacy, however contrary to 
prevailing international prescriptions that choice might seem. This more positive variant of 
the exceptionalism thesis would invoke the liberating potential of continuing to be different, 
of understanding why, and choosing a suitable course, regardless of external requirements 
and expectations. 
One of the impediments to fresh thinking about the course of Cuban development is the 
pressure to pass quickly from analysis to prescription. Our focus here is less on the standard 
prescriptive questions of what Washington policy should be or how Europe should react or 
how the transition might be shaped, but rather on a prior, and easily underestimated, task: 
that of understanding and explaining where Cuba has been heading. The “third wave” 
metaphor – open to some severe criticism on more general grounds – has been particularly 
unhelpful here.6 Whatever the trajectory of the Cuban revolution, it is radically out of sync 
with such loosely postulated tendencies. It follows a dynamic of its own, one much more 
driven by the island’s distinctive socio-political experience and geopolitical predicament 
than by any imagined oceanic rhythms. Equally, it would be superficial to attribute the un-
foreseen survival of the Castro regime to purely accidental factors, such as the temporary 
ascendancy of a generous ally in Caracas. Our longer term historical perspective highlights 
the recurrent features of the island’s relationship with external benefactors, both predating 
and providing the key to explaining the otherwise improbable circumstances of today’s 
Chávez-Castro partnership. (More generally, the combined influences of the Bush admini-
                                                     
6  See Laurence Whitehead (2005). 
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stration and the Chávez regime are shifting the axis of political alignment in a large number 
of Latin American countries, potentially redirecting their energies away from the course 
foreseen by liberal international teleology. But if this turns out to be the case it will reflect 
unresolved tensions and neglected tendencies within the various countries concerned, rather 
than simply being the product of external pressures and interventions). 
Viewed from this perspective a mistaken and inflexible external orthodoxy about what must 
(and therefore will) transpire in Cuba when Castro dies becomes a critical feature of the 
situation to be explained, rather than an article of faith beyond empirical verification. Any 
future demise of the Castro regime may precipitate yet a further round of unsuspected out-
comes and deviant responses, not just because of the momentum derived from a past history 
of exceptionalism, but also because opportunities to support conventional liberalization will 
be missed, owing to the preconceptions and analytical failings of various actors in conten-
tion. The risk is high that ill-informed and unreflective policymakers in Miami and Wash-
ington (or indeed in Brussels, London, Madrid or Berlin) will be caught by surprise and re-
act sub-optimally when developments in Cuba fail to correspond to their expectations and 
requirements. Advance planning based on a sober and realistic appreciation of the distinc-
tive features of the Cuban issue could perhaps reduce the chance of a dangerously unex-
pected outcome, but on present evidence it would be more plausible to forecast that a re-
fusal to analyze the implications of Cuban exceptionalism will increase the chances of its 
perpetuation.  
The exceptionalism experienced by Cubans means that their future is open to choice and 
innovation, but at the same time, if they are to capitalize on that possibility they need space 
for unconstrained reflection, something that both Havana and Washington have always de-
nied them. As noted above, if they could reflect on their exceptional past, Cubans might ei-
ther decide that the costs of continuing to deviate so much from prevailing international 
patterns is too high; or they may conclude that after all the sacrifices they have made and the 
costs they have borne, they deserve the fruits of their efforts, or they might devise some in-
termediate path. On this basis, we can distinguish between a negative kind of exceptional-
ism, which we aim to criticize and try to change – the exceptionalism that keeps Cubans in a 
state of polarization and unable to initiate a comprehensive evaluation of their predica-
ment – from an exceptionalism with positive connotations – the liberating potential of being 
different, understanding why, and choosing one's own course accordingly, regardless of 
external impositions. In social science terms our use of exceptionalism runs counter to the 
dominant tendency to break up complex realities into more short time periods or into partial 
fragments, to separate economics from politics or social structure, or to seek out universal 
covering laws or generalizations to explain patterns in each separate sphere. Our perspec-
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tive is long-term, holistic, combining features from across different disciplines, relying on 
broad gauge historical comparisons and contrasts to shed light on how different features 
combine together in a particular context. Collective memories serve to bind together these 
complexities into distinctive patterns. That is why non-Cubans have difficulty making sense 
of what the Cubans are really talking about. It is why simple moral messages are inappro-
priately extracted from their embedded contexts. It is why Cubans may find it helpful to see 
their problems from a more detached and comparative perspective in order to get a handle 
on the real choices available to them. 
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